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Abstract 
 
The introduction of a statutory recognition procedure offers British unions the opportunity to 
reverse membership decline by organising non-union workers.  The aim of this paper is to 
test theories of individual union joining in order to assess the likely impact of the new 
procedure on British union membership.  Responses of a nationally representative sample of 
non-union employees to the question ‘how willing would you be to join a union if one were 
available at your workplace?’ are analysed.  Results suggest that the new legislation will 
cause union membership to rise among manual employees, but that unions will face a much 
harder challenge organising non-manual employees.  Unless unions can change their 
environment, or change themselves then long-term decline is likely. 
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 Introduction 
 
In Great Britain trade union membership, power and influence have declined sharply since 
the end of the 1970s.  The proportion of the workforce that have their wages determined by 
collective bargaining has fallen from 70% in 1979 to just 36% in 1998.  Over the same 
period, union membership declined from 12.9 million to 7.8 million (Metcalf 2001).  Unions 
could reverse declining membership in two ways:  first, by strengthening organization and 
increasing membership in workplaces where they already have a recognition agreement (if 
mean union density in workplaces where unions are already recognized were to return to the 
levels of 1980, union membership would rise by around 2.3 millions).  Second, by recruiting, 
organising and gaining recognition in workplaces currently without a union presence.  The 
1998 British Social Attitudes Survey found that 40% of employees in non-union workplaces 
would be very likely or fairly likely to join a union if one were present at their workplace.  If 
unions were able to use the statutory recognition procedure created by the 1999 Employment 
Relations Act to organise these workers, union membership would rise by around 3.2 
millions.  Of course unions will only be able to do this if employees who want to unionise are 
concentrated in similar jobs and industries.  Otherwise unions will not enjoy sufficient 
support to win recognition campaigns.  This paper focuses on the viability of union 
membership renewal through organising non-union employees. 
The aim of this paper is to examine the determinants of willingness to join a union 
among non-union employees, using a nationally representative sample of non-union 
employees from the 1998 British Social Attitudes Survey.  Although studies that examine the 
attitudes of non-union employees towards unionisation are common in the USA, this is the 
first time such an analysis has been attempted for the UK.  The analysis will test of the 
applicability of US theories of union joining to Great Britain.  It will also allow an 
assessment of the likely impact of the new procedure for statutory union recognition 
(introduced in the 1999 Employment Relations Act) to be made.  Reviewing the evidence 
provided by the Workplace Employee Relations Survey series, Millward, Bryson and Forth 
(2000) argued that British employees had ‘lost their appetite’ for union membership.  The 
paper will also allow an assessment of the scale of that loss of appetite.  The paper is 
organized as follows:  Section 1 looks at issues around union membership and union 
recognition, specifically the causes of union decline, the opportunities and threats for unions 
contained in the 1999 Employment Relations Act.  It argues that the key to union fortunes, at
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least in the short-term is the attitude of non-union employees to union membership.  Section 2 
reviews the literature and theory on the determinants of union joining, and develops testable 
predictions based on theory.  Section 3 describes the British Social Attitudes Survey data; 
Section 4 sets out the results and discusses the practical implications.  Section 5 sets out 
conclusions. 
 
 
1.  Union Membership and Recognition in Great Britain 
 
1.1  The causes of union membership decline  
 
Analysis of successive Workplace Industrial Relations surveys have shown that since 1980, 
private sector employers establishing new workplaces have been unlikely to bargain with 
unions, and that the consequent decline in union recognition is a key cause of the overall 
decline in trade union membership (Disney et al., 1995; Machin, 2001; Millward et al., 
2000).  This decline in union recognition can be partly attributed to 1) the actions of the 
Conservative Governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major, and 2) to wider changes in 
the structure of UK and world economies.  Product markets were de-regulated, state 
controlled enterprises privatised and state subsidies cut.  Previously protected industries were 
exposed to the full force of global competition.  In this environment management had a 
stronger incentive to resist unionisation.  Policies of full employment were abandoned in 
favour of control of inflation so unemployment soared.  The state withdrew support for 
collective bargaining which had existed since the 1968 Royal Commission (Donovan report).  
The ‘abstentionist’ legal framework and tacit government support for collective bargaining 
that had its roots in the 1906 trades disputes act was abandoned.  In its place were a series of 
rigid legal rules that restricted the ability of unions to pursue industrial action; unions could 
no longer coerce employers into ‘voluntary’ recognition agreements with threats of secondary 
action and ‘blacking’ of work (Dunn and Metcalf, 1996).  The cumulative effect of these 
changes seriously weakened unions, however academic opinion differs on the inevitability of 
further decline.  Towers (1997) has argued that the decline of unions has left a ‘representation 
gap’.  Workers still desire a voice at work, this desire offers unions a way back.  By contrast, 
Millward et al. (2000) after reviewing the evidence of successive WER surveys came to the 
conclusion that employees had ‘lost their appetite’ for union membership, so decline is set to 
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continue (Pencavel, 2000, discusses this debate, and argues that the balance of evidence 
supports Millward et al.).  Machin (2001) reached a similar conclusion.   
If unions are to reverse membership decline, they will have to organize workers in the 
non-union private sector.  The statutory recognition procedure introduced by the 1999 
Employment Relations Act offers unions the prospect of organising these workers.  Whether 
this prospect can be realised depends upon the way in which the unions respond to the 
opportunity, the way in which the legislation works in practice, and of course the level of 
demand for unions among non-union employees.  The next section casts a brief eye over the 
union and employer responses to the statutory recognition procedure, and the early evidence 
about the way in which the procedure is working in practice. 
 
1.2  The impact of statutory recognition; an initial assessment 
 
The 1999 Employment Relations Act introduced a statutory procedure for recognizing trade 
unions for collective bargaining purposes.  The first principle of the procedure is 
majoritarianism; the main justification for awarding recognition is that the majority of the 
workforce want it.  The employer must recognise a union if either the union can demonstrate 
that more than 50% of workers in the bargaining unit are union members.  Or if a majority of 
the workforce in the bargaining unit vote for union recognition, and this majority includes 
more than 40% of the workforce in that bargaining unit, i.e. a simple majority is not enough if 
turnout is low.  (See Wood et al., 2001 for a full discussion of the new procedure and Wood 
and Goddard, 1999 for a comparison with the US and Canadian systems).  Although this 
legislation is an advance for trade unions, key features of a neo-liberal environment are 
preserved; a change in government has not restored the trade union privileges and protection 
removed by successive Conservative governments.  Neither the state or leading managers 
envisage a significant role for unions in macro-economic management and the union role in 
the workplace remains limited (Boxall and Haynes, 1997).   
Unions are responding to this environment by investing increased resources in 
organising and recruitment activity (Heery et al., 2000).  However there remain large 
variations in trade union organising effectiveness.  It seems likely that unions’ ability to get 
new recognition agreements will depend in large part on the attitudes and behaviour of 
employers (Charlwood, 2001).  Kleiner (2000) develops an analytical framework to explain 
variation in union membership levels between the USA and Canada.  He posits that the key 
variable, which explains the difference in unionisation rates between these two countries is 
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the intensity of management resistance.  The intensity of management resistance reflects the 
balance of incentives and disincentives to oppose unionisation.  This analytical framework 
clearly has important implications for Britain, which are investigated below.   
Research by Forth and Millward using the 1998 WER survey has demonstrated that 
there is a union wage differential of 10%, but that there is no difference in the current level of 
pay settlements, in other words the union wage mark-up is a historical legacy which is 
unlikely to be carried forward when employers sign new union recognition agreements (Forth 
and Millward, 2000a; 2000b).  Therefore the immediate threat of unions raising wage costs is 
minimal; this threat is further reduced by the willingness of unions to pursue policies of 
partnership and co-operation with employers.  This means that the costs of unionisation are 
likely to be low if employers establish a partnership with a union voluntarily.  An employer 
must weigh these (probably minimal) costs against the risks of higher costs caused by an 
aggressive organising campaign from a hostile union.  In the USA, an employer can be 
confident that he or she will be able to use the legal minefield of the NLRB procedure to 
exclude unions indefinitely.  This may yet become the case in the UK, but until case law is 
established any employer attempting to do this would face considerable risk.  The threat of 
future militancy and the inconvenience of having to negotiate with unions may mean that 
employer’s preferences are to remain union free, but until employers have a full 
understanding of the tactics which they can get away with, the intensity of resistance is likely 
to be low by North American standards.   
Evidence on employer attitudes and behaviour support this hypothesis.  Surveys of 
employers found that just one non-union employer in five said that they would definitely 
oppose a union organizing campaign (Gall and McKay, 2001).  There is anecdotal evidence 
that some employers are fiercely resisting unions, but a large number of voluntary agreements 
are also being concluded.  According to TUC figures, in the period from Labour’s election 
victory in 1997 to the end of 2000, 323 new recognition agreements were signed between 
unions and employers.  50% of these agreements occurred during the year the procedure 
became law (2000).  All but one of these agreements was signed voluntarily.  As of 
November 2000, just twelve cases were under Central Arbitration Committee adjudication 
(TUC, 2001).  This evidence suggests that in the short term at least, unions are facing a 
relatively permissive organising environment; the biggest constraint on unions is likely to be 
the attitudes of the workforce.  Particularly if Millward et al. are correct in arguing that 
employees have lost their appetite for union membership.  The next section explores the 
theoretical literature on employee attitudes towards unionisation. 
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2.  Theories of Union Joining 
 
There is an extensive theoretical and empirical literature of attempts to model the individual’s 
unionisation decision.  Wheeler and McClendon’s extremely useful review of the literature 
cites 36 separate studies from the USA alone (Wheeler and McClendon, 1991).  They also 
cite similar studies from Great Britain, Canada, Holland and France.  The British literature is 
less extensive, Wheeler and McClendon cite a single study; Guest and Dewe’s (1988) social 
psychological study of union membership among a sample of workers in the UK electronics 
industry.  Although that study uses a similar theoretical framework to the one adopted here, it 
is based on workers in a single industry, not a nationally representative sample of all workers, 
and examines union membership among workers who are already unionised, not willingness 
to join a union among non-union workers.  Wheeler and McClendon use three classifications 
for the theoretical models used in these studies.  First, model A:  
frustration/dissatisfaction/dissonance explanations of union joining.  Second, model B:  
explanations based on a rational evaluation of the benefits of union membership.  Third, 
model C:  political/ideological explanations.   
 
2.1  Theoretical framework 
 
Model A – Dissonance theories:  Dissonance theories are based on the premise that 
dissonance between expectations of work (e.g. that work should be enjoyable and rewarding) 
and the experience of work (e.g. work environment is unpleasant and pay is low) is the 
trigger to unionisation (see for example Premack and Hunter, 1988).  However if dissonance 
causes workers to want to unionise they will only do so if they perceive unions to be effective 
at remedying their discontent.  From this theoretical insight we can develop two hypotheses 
that can be tested using the BSAS98 data: 
Hypothesis 1:  An individual who expresses job dissatisfaction will be more likely 
to be willing to join a union than an individual who is satisfied. 
Hypothesis 2:  An individual who believes that their pay is low will be more 
likely to be willing to unionise than an individual who believes that their pay is 
reasonable or on the high side. 
 
Model B – Utility theories:  Utility theories are based on the premise that the 
decision to unionise is based on a rational calculation of the costs and benefits of unionisation 
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compared to the costs and benefits of remaining non-union (see for example Farber and Saks, 
1980).  Clearly this theory is not incompatible with model A, however under model B 
employees can unionise even if they are not dissatisfied.  Model B leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3:  An individual will be more likely to unionise if he or she believes 
that the presence of a union at their workplace will improve their workplace, and be less 
likely to unionise if he or she believes that a union would make no difference or make 
their workplace worse. 
 
Model C – Political/ ideological belief theories:  Model C is distinct from the other 
two models because it is not based on a rational calculation of costs and benefits.  Individuals 
will unionise for these altruistic reasons if they have left wing political views which lead 
them to believe in the necessity of social solidarity between workers (Adams, 1974).  Adams 
himself rejected this idea as overly simplistic, subsequent studies have found little evidence 
to support it.  However it is also possible that political beliefs may cause workers to unionise 
for reasons that are not altruistic.  Political beliefs will alter an individual’s assessment of the 
costs and benefits of unionisation.  An individual with left wing political views is likely to 
believe that the benefits of unionisation are higher, and the costs lower, while an individual 
with right wing political views is likely to believe the opposite (Kelly, 1998).  Political views 
may affect willingness to join a union by altering an individual’s calculation of the utility of 
union membership, instead of via the more simplistic mechanism of altruism set out in model 
C. 
Hypothesis 4:  An individual with left-wing political views will be more likely to 
be willing to join a union than an individual with centrist or right-wing political views. 
 
Wheeler and McClendon developed a theoretically rigorous model, which also 
integrates models A and B and which fits the large body of empirical evidence.  Simply put, 
they argue that the trigger to unionisation is a gap between expectations and achievements, 
but the form that the gap takes influences the path to unionisation or rejection of unionisation 
that the individual follows.  From the perspective of this paper the problem with this theory 
is, it is not possible to directly test it using the cross-section data available. 
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2.2  Other influences on desire for union membership 
 
Demographic and individual characteristics:  Many of the previous studies in this area 
have found associations between particular individual and demographic characteristics (e.g. 
gender, age, occupation) and willingness to unionise.  However, with two notable exceptions, 
there is little consistency between the findings of different studies.  These exceptions are that 
other things equal, workers aged 60 and over are less likely to unionise, and black workers 
are more likely to unionise.  Wheeler and McClendon explain the latter finding in terms of 
greater solidarity, and higher levels of dissatisfaction due to discrimination.  It seems likely 
that where studies do find associations between individual characteristics, that similar 
explanations can be extrapolated.  For this reason it is sensible to use multivariate analysis to 
control for these characteristics.  The empirical models presented in Section 4 include 
controls for age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, educational attainment, geographical 
location, occupation, job tenure, broad industry and workplace size.  Separate models are 
estimated for manual and non-manual employees.  Previous studies of unionisation in Great 
Britain (Green, 1990, Bain and Elias, 1985) have found significantly different patterns of 
unionisation between these two groups of workers.  These differences are likely to reflect 
fundamental differences in the experience of work at the point of production.  Finally, there 
are a number of other factors which might be expected to systematically influence an 
individual’s propensity to unionise, these are discussed below. 
Previous union membership:  If an individual who is currently a non-member in a 
non-union workplace was formerly a union member this may affect their perceptions of union 
instrumentality.  If Towers (1997) is correct in arguing that Conservative policies towards 
trade unions created a ‘representation gap’ we would expect former members to be more 
likely to join in the future.   
Current union membership:  A small proportion of employees in non-union 
workplaces retain union membership despite the lack of a bargaining presence for that union 
at their workplace (this is the equivalent of associate membership in the USA).  We would 
expect these individuals to be more likely to join a workplace union if one were available. 
Alternative voice mechanisms :  Evidence from the USA shows that if managers put 
in place effective non-union participation and representation structures, workers no longer 
desire union representation (Freeman and Rogers, 1999).  Therefore we would expect 
workers who report non-union representation at their workplace to be less likely to want to 
join a union.  However evidence on the effectiveness of non-union representation in Britain 
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points in the opposite direction; the limitations of non-union voice actually increase desire for 
unionisation in the company studied by Gollan (2001). 
Voice or exit?:  Dissatisfied workers can either seek to change their workplace 
through unionisation (voice) or quit to find a new job that meets their expectations of 
employment (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Hirschman, 1970).  Therefore we might expect that 
employees who intend to voluntarily quit their job for reasons other than retirement will be 
less likely to want to join a union. 
 
 
3.  Data 
 
Data comes from the 1998 British Social Attitudes Survey.  This is the sixteenth of an annual 
series designed and conducted by the National Centre for Social Research.  The survey is 
designed as a representative sample of British adults, aged 18 and over.  Overall 3,146 
interviews were carried out, a response rate of 59%, of these, 1408 were employees in 
employment.  Full details of the survey design can be found in Jowell et al. (1999).  The 
strength of the British Social Attitudes survey is that it questions employees on aspects of 
workplace life and industrial relations.  It also contains detailed information on employee’s 
social and political attitudes and socio-economic background, which may have an important 
bearing on their attitudes and actions towards trade unions (Bryson, 1999).  The weakness of 
the data stems from the breadth of subjects that the survey examines.  This means that a lot of 
key variables are based on single items that may fail to adequately capture the factor that they 
are attempting to measure.  The usual disclaimers about the limitations of cross-section data 
apply; it can only illuminate associations between variables, not causal relationships.   
For the purposes of this paper, the key question was, ‘If there were a trade union 
present at your workplace, how likely would you be to join?’ Respondents were asked to 
reply on a four-point scale, from very likely, to not at all likely.  Responses to this question 
were used as the dependent variable in cross-tabulations and multivariate analysis.  
Observations were discarded if they had missing values for any of the variables used in the 
multivariate analysis.  This left 285 observations for non-manual workers, and 197 
observations for manual workers.   
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4.  Results and Discussion 
 
Table 1 shows cross-tabulations between willingness to join a union and a range of 
individual, job and workplace characteristics for employees in non-manual occupations.  
Table 2 presents the same information for employees in manual occupations.  50% of manual 
employees describe themselves as either very likely or fairly likely to join a union if one were 
available at their workplace.  The equivalent figure for non-manual employees is 33 %.   
These results suggest that unions will be able to achieve recognition agreements using 
the statutory procedure among groups of manual workers, but that getting majority support 
among groups of non-manual employees will be more difficult.  Two major caveats need to 
be added to this extrapolation.  First, we don’t know how workers are distributed across 
workplaces.  Second, we do not know how employee’s attitudes towards union membership 
will change in the context of a union organizing campaign.  Research from the USA suggests 
that union and employer tactics are critically important influences on the individual 
unionisation decision (Bronfrenbrenner, 1997).  What these figures do show is the baseline 
from which unions will be starting.  In the case of non-manual employees this baseline may 
be too low for unions to be able to achieve majority support in most circumstances. 
The cross-tabulations show a very strong relationship between a belief in union 
instrumentality and willingness to unionise for both groups of employees.  Among manual 
workers, 28% thought that a union would make their workplace better in some way, with 
57% indifferent.  Among non-manuals, the proportion who thought that unions would make 
their workplace better was just 12.5%, with 67% indifferent.  Given the strength of the 
relationship between a belief in union instrumentality and willingness to join, the scale of 
employee indifference towards unions that these figures reveal should surely be a cause of 
concern for unions.   
There is also a positive relationship between both job dissatisfaction, perceptions of 
low pay and willingness to join for both groups.  These initial findings are in line with both 
dissonance and utility theories of unionisation.  To investigate these associations further, and 
to get estimates of the influence of other individual, demographic and workplace 
characteristics all other things being equal two regression models were estimated, the first for 
employees in manual occupations, the second for employees in non-manual occupations1.  
The results from these analyses were then converted to marginal effects.  Marginal effects 
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can be interpreted as the change in the probability of an individual being in each of the four 
categories compared to the sample mean if the dummy variable changes from zero to one and 
all other things are held equal.  The exceptions are the two scale variables for social and 
political attitudes (information about the components of these scales and descriptive statistics 
for the scales themselves can be found in the technical appendix).  Here the marginal effects 
can be interpreted as the change in the percentage probability of being in each category if 
there is a one standard deviation change in the individual’s score on the scale and all other 
things are held constant.  The marginal effects for the two samples are reported in Tables 3 
and 4.  Full details of the modelling procedures and full results from the regression analyses 
can be found in the technical appendix.   
Dissonance:  Contrary to expectations, there is with one exception, no association 
between increased job dissatisfaction and increased willingness to join a union compared to 
the sample mean, other things being equal.  The exception is for non-manual employees who 
are highly dissatisfied.  However there is large and statistically significant association 
between high levels of job satisfaction and decreased willingness to join a union for both 
manual and non-manual employees.  The results for low pay are similar, although the size of 
the effects are smaller, and with one exception not statistically significant (the exception is 
non-manual employees who perceive themselves to be very low paid, who are around 13% 
more likely to want to unionise than an equivalent worker who believes that their pay is 
reasonable) These findings only partially confirm hypotheses one and two, but they are still 
compatible with path theories of unionisation which see dissatisfaction as a trigger.  Workers 
who are very satisfied are dramatically less likely to want to unionise than all other workers.  
High levels of satisfaction mean that conditions do not provide a potential unionisation 
trigger.  For all other workers there is an element of dissatisfaction built into the job, which 
may provide a trigger for unionisation.   
These results are different from comparable results in the USA (e.g. Kochan, 1980; 
Farber and Saks, 1980).  US results find that increasing job dissatisfaction is associated with 
an increased propensity to unionise.  The difference may be explained by the different 
context in which the data was collected.  In America, the union organising campaign provides 
the trigger – unions focus general dissatisfaction on a few key issues, and mobilise around 
them.  In Britain, this mobilisation process is absent so the results differ.   
                                                                                                                                                        
1 The extremely strong correlation between perceived union instrumentality and willingness to join meant that 
union instrumentality variables could not be included in the model.   
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Politics:  As expected there is a strong positive relationship between left wing 
political views and willingness to join a union and a negative relationship between right-wing 
political views and willingness to join.  The effect is smaller for manual workers than for 
non-manual workers.  Other things being equal a manual worker at the left extreme of the 
distribution would be 24% more likely to join compared to a worker at the sample mean 
while a manual worker with political views on the right extreme of the distribution would be 
24% less likely to join.  A non-manual worker with extreme left views would be 27% more 
likely to join, while a non-manual worker with extreme right wing views would be 27% less 
likely to be willing to join.  These results confirm hypothesis four.  The influence of social 
attitudes also varies with occupation.  The association between authoritarian social attitudes 
and a decreased willingness to join is slight and insignificant for non-manuals.  It is larger for 
manual workers, a manual worker with libertarian views would be 19% more likely to be 
willing to join compared to the sample mean, while a manual worker with authoritarian views 
would be 19% less likely to be willing to join.  This association is only just short of statistical 
significance.   
Previous union membership:  Among manual employees, a former member is 
around 14% more likely to want to join a union compared to the sample mean (effectively a 
worker who has never been a union member).  For non-manual employees, previous union 
membership has absolutely no relationship with current willingness to join.  This finding 
suggests that for manual workers only, there is a representation gap.  Manual workers have 
not ‘lost their appetite’ for union membership (or if some have, considerable numbers retain 
it), rather management have taken union membership off the menu.  This finding suggests 
that the observed fall in union membership in workplaces where unions continue to have a 
presence that prompted Millward et al. to reach their ‘loss of appetite’ conclusion was not 
solely due to changes in the preferences of workers.  Instead management behaviour, which 
reduced union effectiveness seems a likely cause (see Fairbrother, 2000 for case-study 
examples of this process). 
Geography:  The problem with straightforward geographical variables (for example 
Government administrative regions) is that they are a rather crude way of measuring the 
characteristics of an area where a person lives.  Differences in the distribution of wealth and 
industry within geographical regions (for example between urban and rural areas) are likely 
to be as important as differences between regions.  The Office of National Statistics (ONS) 
has developed social economic categories for different localities based on data from the 1991 
census.  These categories are; Mining, Manufacturing and Industry (traditional industrial 
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areas), Prosperous England  (the most affluent suburban, rural and urban areas), Outer 
London and Education Centres (London suburbs and large towns and cities like Oxford and 
Brighton), Inner London, Rural Areas, Urban Fringe (suburban towns, mixed light 
manufacturing and services) and Coast and Services (Large towns and cities with service 
dominated economies, e.g. Bristol and Leeds, and coastal towns and cities).  Further details 
of these categories can be found in the technical appendix.   
Among manual workers, an individual’s probability of being willing to join a union is 
higher if the individual lives in a mining, manufacturing and industry area, coast and services 
area or an education centres and outer London area.  One possible reason for this relates to 
the dominant type of industry likely to be present in these types of areas, which is more likely 
to be traditional unionised heavy industry.  Previous employment in these industries or close 
relatives and friends employed in these industries may lead to normative values that are in 
favour of union membership (Klandermans, 1984).  However, this does not explain the 
education and outer London finding.  A second possible explanation might be residence in 
predominantly working class communities; manual workers in these areas are more likely to 
be geographically concentrated in working class communities, and to have direct or indirect 
experience of trade unionism.  This is particularly the case for the education centres and outer 
London areas because high housing costs concentrate manual workers in areas of local 
authority and ex-local authority housing.  Education centres and outer London areas are also 
more likely to have tight local labour markets, and this may make workers bolder in 
expressing their desire for unionisation, while higher living costs may strengthen the 
incentive. 
Among non-manual workers there is a smaller but still statistically significant 
association between increased willingness to join and residence in rural areas, outer London 
and education centres areas and mining, manufacturing and industry areas, this finding is 
harder to explain.  Once again it may relate to the type of industry located in these areas, and 
the type of more detailed occupational categories of the residents.  Non-manual employees in 
occupations like shop assistants, call centre agents and clerical work may hold similar 
attitudes to unions as close family members in manual employment.  Overall, the findings on 
the influence of geography show that where you live impacts on your willingness to unionise.  
The most likely explanation of this finding is that the community and the family plays a key 
role in shaping an individual’s normative values and that these normative values reflect the 
previous and current experience of work among the community and family. 
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Occupation:  Among manual workers, individuals in the other unskilled occupations 
were around 13% less likely to want to unionise compared to the sample mean (as were 
individuals in personal and protective services occupations, but this relationship was not 
statistically significant).  It should be noted that around half of individuals in this category 
fell into the sub-category of cleaners and domestics.  Individuals in these occupations are 
more likely to have a tenuous connection to the labour market; consequently they may feel 
that the risk of unionisation is too great, or that it is not worth unionising because they are 
unlikely to stay in the job long.  There were no statistically significant differences among 
non-manual workers, although associate professional and technical occupations were around 
10% more likely to want to unionise and other unskilled occupations were around 20% more 
likely to want to unionise.  (The latter group consists entirely of care assistants.) 
Personal characteristics:  There were no large or statistically significant differences 
between men and women, white and non-white and married or single people in either sample.  
Workers aged 60 and over were much less likely to be willing to unionise for both samples.  
Manual workers who worked part-time were around 25% more likely to want to unionise.   
Education:  An individual’s level of educational attainment does influence 
willingness to join a union, but the effects are different for manual and non-manual 
employees.  A manual worker who has experienced higher education is around 32% more 
likely to be willing to unionise, while a non-manual worker with the same level of education 
is likely to be 10% less likely to want to unionise (both are statistically significant).  This may 
be because the dissonance between the expectations of work and its realities are greatest for 
university educated manual workers.  The result for non-manual workers may be because 
higher education is acting as a proxy for expectation of promotion, which some studies have 
shown is associated with decreased willingness to unionise (Farber and Saks, 1980).  
Alternatively, graduates in non-manual occupations may feel more able to solve employment 
problems themselves. 
Job tenure  - Individuals in both samples are approximately 10% more likely to want 
to unionise if they have been in their present job for two to five years (the size of the 
association is slightly larger for manual workers).  There is no clear reason why this should 
be, but it does suggest that union organizing campaigns may be more successful if unions 
wait for a few years after a new workplace opens before attempting to organize it.  
Surprisingly, there is no relationship between an intention to quit and a decreased willingness 
to unionise. 
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Workplace size :  Among non-manual employees, workplace size has little effect on 
the propensity to unionise.  However, among manual employees, working in a large 
workplace with 500 or more employees is associated with a 25% increase in an individual’s 
probability of being willing to unionise.  Presumably this is because manual employees in 
large workplaces feel unable to influence management by acting individually.   
Non-Union representation:  The presence of non-union reps in the workplace had 
virtually no influence on an individual’s willingness to unionise, this result is in stark contrast 
to comparable results from the USA (Freeman and Rogers, 1999).  It suggests that there are 
large cultural differences in the way British and American managers manage employee voice.  
However the prediction of Gollan (2001) that dissatisfaction with non-union representation 
will actually increase demand for union membership is not supported by the results. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
The introduction of a statutory trade union recognition procedure in the United Kingdom as 
part of the 1999 employment relations act means that the issue of why workers choose 
unionise has become of critical importance for assessing if British trade unions will be able to 
reverse membership decline.  Assessments of the effects of British unions on an enterprise’s 
wage bill, polls of employers, and evidence from new recognition agreements signed in the 
last twelve months all suggest that British unions will face a less hostile employer response to 
organising drives than their counterparts in the USA.  However the critical factor is likely to 
be the ability of unions to demonstrate the majority support of the workforce, so the 
individual unionisation decision is crucial.  Theory suggests that 1) dissatisfaction is the 
critical trigger to unionisation.  2) Individuals who are dissatisfied (and even those who are 
not) also need to perceive that a union will be effective before they will join, so calculations 
of the utility of union membership are very important.  3) Politics and ideology and notions 
of social solidarity may lead workers to unionise for altruistic reasons.  Political views 
affecting an individual’s willingness to join a union can also be explained by the fact that 
they change an individual’s calculations of the utility of union membership, this explanation 
is more easily compatible with points one and two.   
Empirical analyses were carried out using willingness to join a union as the dependent 
variable.  To summarise these results in an easily digestible form, the probabilities of being 
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either very or fairly likely to join a union, and of believing that a union would make their 
workplace better were calculated for six ‘typical workers' (three each for the manual and non-
manual samples), two have high probabilities of joining, two have near average probabilities 
of joining, and two have low probabilities of joining.  The probabilities and typical worker 
characteristics are set out in Table 5. 
Results offer some support to all of the theories set out above.  However increasing 
dissatisfaction does not increase willingness to join, instead a high level of satisfaction 
reduces willingness to join.  However in the context of an organising campaign this result 
might change.  In addition, geographical location also plays an important role in determining 
an individual’s willingness to join a union, this was not predicted by theory.  The main 
explanation for this, certainly among manual workers, is likely to be that residents of 
traditional industrial areas, and predominantly working class communities are more 
influenced by notions of social solidarity than residents in more prosperous and socially 
diverse areas.  These normative values affect calculations of the utility of union membership.  
This finding fits with the ‘value expectancy theory’ of Klandermans (1984).  Perhaps the 
theoretical frameworks developed and tested in North America have neglected important 
causal variables by failing to incorporating these ideas into theory.  Consequently subsequent 
empirical studies have not sought to test these ideas, so have found no evidence for them.  
However any attempt to explicitly test value expectancy theory will be hampered by the cost 
and complexity of collecting the data which will be needed to operationalise it. 
The results suggest that non-manual workers in particular have lost their appetite for 
unionisation, but a significant number of manual workers retain their appetite for unions.  
Therefore Union membership is likely to rise as a direct result of the new statutory 
recognition procedure, because it will allow unions to meet the currently unmet demand for 
union representation among manual workers.  Because support for unionisation among 
manual workers is geographically concentrated community unionism initiatives might prove 
effective, although British unions appear reluctant to develop this type of strategy (Wills, 
2000).  However, in the long term decline looks set to continue, because the level of demand 
for unionisation among the growing number of employees in non-manual work is simply not 
high enough for unions to be able to win majority support.  Employment levels among 
manual workers are falling, while non-manual employment is set to increase (see Table 6).  
Similarly population is declining in the traditional union heartlands, and increasing in the 
more prosperous and suburban parts of the country where demand for union membership is 
less (see Table 7).  If further union decline is to be avoided public policy will need to shift in 
16 
a direction which provides more support for unions or unions will have to become much 
more effective in persuading workers that unionisation will make a difference to their 
working lives.  Whether unions can do this on a large scale without stronger support from 
government or employers is an open question.  The difficulties that unions are likely to face 
in securing majority support, particularly among non-manual workers may force them to 
develop new services which appeal to the large and growing group of workers who do not 
appear to believe that traditional forms of collective action are appropriate ways of 
remedying their problems at work.  White-collar unions in particular may have to develop 
new business models if they are unable to develop traditional forms of collective organisation 
in non-union workplaces.  Without collective workplace union organisation increasing, 
amounts of full-time officials’ time will become tied up with individual casework for isolated 
individual members, and there will be insufficient full-time officials to meet the demand for 
servicing given the current level of membership fees (Willman, 2001).  However unions may 
face stiff competition to provide individual services from law firms and Internet recruitment 
agencies (Freeman and Diamond, 2001).  If unions are unable or unwilling to change either 
themselves or their environment membership decline will continue in the long-term.
17 
Table 1:  Individual willingness to join a union if one were available at the workplace among non-manual 
employees by personal, job and workplace characteristics 
 
Cell percentages 
 % Very 
likely to 
join 
% Fairly 
likely to 
join 
% Unlikely 
to join 
% Not at all 
likely to 
join 
% Of sample 
with 
characteristic 
All 
 
9.3 24 32.2 34.5  
Belief in Union 
instrumentality 
A union would make my 
workplace…. 
     
A lot better 82 18 0 0 3.1 
A little better 42 48 6 4 9.4 
No difference 4 25 39 32 69 
A little worse 4 14 25 57 8 
A lot worse 0 5 25 70 10.3 
Job satisfaction      
Very satisfied 3 11.5 32.1 54.4 37.1 
Fairly satisfied 12.8 29.4 32.8 24.9 46.1 
Not very satisfied 24.5 26.7 26.7 22.2 12.8 
Not at all satisfied 
 
28.5 35.8 14.4 21.4 4 
Pay      
Pay is ‘on the high side’ 4.7 4.7 27.9 62.8 12.2 
Pay is ‘reasonable’ 6 23.9 35.3 34.8 56.9 
Pay is ‘a bit low’ 10.5 30.3 32.9 26.3 21.5 
Pay is ‘very low’ 
 
33.4 36.4 18.2 12.1 9.4 
Individual characteristics      
Current union member 24.9 31.3 6.2 37.5 4.5 
Former union member 12 21.7 30.1 36.1 23.5 
Intention to quit  19.8 26.9 26.9 20.9 25.9 
Age       
18 - 24 11.1 33.4 51.1 4.4 12.7 
25 – 34 8.2 22.9 25.7 43 30.8 
35 – 44 9 29.9 28.6 28.6 21.8 
45 – 59 11.3 17.9 32.1 38.7 29.9 
60+ 
 
0 6.6 26.7 66.5 4.2 
Gender      
Men  9.8 21.1 26.3 42.9 37.6 
Women 
 
9.1 25.8 35.8 29.4 62.4 
Marital status      
Married  8.7 22.5 29.2 39.6 67.8 
Single 
 
10.5 27.2 38.6 23.7 32.2 
Ethnicity      
White 9.7 23.8 32.3 34.3 96.3 
Non-white 
 
 
0 30.8 30.8 38.4 3.7 
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 % Very 
likely to 
join 
% Fairly 
likely to 
join 
% Unlikely 
to join 
% Not at all 
likely to 
join 
% Of sample 
with 
characteristic 
Highest educational 
qualification 
     
None 10.7 27.6 36.4 25.5 13.3 
GCSE or equivalent 9 24.6 45.1 21.3 34.6 
A level or equivalent 12.9 33.3 22.2 31.5 15.3 
Higher education 
 
7.7 18.5 22.3 51.5 36.8 
Geographical location      
Prosperous England 7.7 12.3 46.1 33.8 18.4 
Urban fringe 6.6 24.2 25.3 44 25.7 
Rural areas 4.6 34.9 18.6 41.8 12.2 
Outer London & Education 
centres 
3.9 16 44.1 36 7.1 
Inner London 9 18 36.3 36.3 3.1 
Coast and Services 17.6 14.7 47.1 20.6 9.6 
Mining, manufacturing & 
industry 
14.1 34 25.9 25.9 24 
Job characteristics      
Occupation      
Manager and senior 
administrative 
7.5 19.4 22.4 51 27.7 
Professional 4.1 24.9 29.2 41.6 6.8 
Associate professional and 
technical 
10.3 23 35.8 30.8 11 
Clerical 11.5 28.3 37.2 23 31.9 
Personal and protective 
services 
24.8 12.4 24.8 37.6 2.3 
Sales 5.7 26.8 37.3 29.8 18.9 
Other unskilled 39.7 0 39.7 21.6 1.4 
Job tenure      
< 1 year 5.4 26.1 35.9 32.6 26 
1 – 2 years 10.6 33.3 28.8 27.3 18.6 
2 – 5 years 13.9 19 37.9 29.1 22.3 
5 – 10 years 12.5 17.2 29.7 40.6 18.1 
10+ years 
 
3.7 24.5 24.5 47.2 15 
Part-time 8.7 26.1 31.5 33.7 26 
Fulltime 9.5 23.3 32.4 34.7 74 
Workplace characteristics      
Industry      
Production sector 8.9 17.9 32.9 40.3 19.4 
Public services 7.6 34.5 30.8 27 7.3 
Private services 
 
9.9 24.9 31.2 34 73.1 
Non union representative at 
workplace 
7.5 27.5 35 30 11.6 
Workplace size      
1 – 9 employees 8.4 24.2 36.8 30.5 26.8 
10 – 24 employees 6.8 27.1 27.1 39 16.7 
25 – 99 employees 11.2 26.5 32.7 29.6 27.7 
100 – 499 employees 11.9 16.4 35.8 35.8 18.9 
500 + employees 5.7 25.7 0.2 48.5 9.9 
 
Weighted base:  300 individual employees in non-manual jobs 
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Table 2:  Individual willingness to join a union if one were available at the workplace among manual 
employees by personal, job and workplace characteristics 
 
Cell percentages 
 % Very 
likely to 
join 
% Fairly 
likely to 
join 
% Unlikely 
to join 
% Not at all 
likely to 
join 
% Of sample 
with 
characteristic 
All 
 
22.1 27.5 26.7 23.6 - 
Belief in Union 
instrumentality 
A union would make my 
workplace…. 
     
A lot better 86 14 0 0 14.3 
A little better 27 57 8 8 13.5 
No difference 9 31 32 28 57.9 
A little worse 11 0 71 18 7.1 
A lot worse 17 1 17 65 7.1 
Job satisfaction      
Very satisfied 7.6 33.7 31.5 27.2 35.7 
Fairly satisfied 28.8 26.3 23.7 21.2 45.7 
Not very satisfied 34.4 18.5 31.3 15.6 12.4 
Not at all satisfied 
 
31.3 18.7 12.6 37.6 6.2 
Pay      
Pay is ‘on the high side’ 15.5 15.5 0.385 30.8 5 
Pay is ‘reasonable’ 15.9 30.4 28.8 24.8 48.5 
Pay is ‘a bit low’ 29.2 23.6 27.8 19.5 27.9 
Pay is ‘very low’ 
 
29.2 29.2 16.7 25 18.6 
Individual characteristics      
Current union member 39.9 20 20 20 3.9 
Former union member 29.7 24.2 19.8 26.4 35.4 
Intention to quit  29.2 22.2 27.8 20.8 28.1 
Age       
18 - 24 23.8 31 16.6 28.6 16.3 
25 – 34 16.9 35.2 33.8 14.1 27.5 
35 – 44 22.4 32.7 25.8 19 22.5 
45 – 59 28.4 16.2 28.4 27 28.7 
60+ 
 
8.4 16.8 8.4 66.7 4.7 
Gender      
Men  18.8 26.7 28.3 26.1 53.5 
Women 
 
25.8 28.3 25 20.8 46.5 
Marital status      
Married  20.4 24.7 30.9 24.1 62.8 
Single 
 
25 32.3 19.8 22.9 37.2 
Ethnicity      
White 21.8 27 26.6 24.6 96.1 
Non-white 
 
29.9 39.9 42.8 0 3.9 
Highest educational 
qualification 
     
None 21 32.9 17.1 29 29.5 
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 % Very 
likely to 
join 
% Fairly 
likely to 
join 
% Unlikely 
to join 
% Not at all 
likely to 
join 
% Of sample 
with 
characteristic 
GCSE or equivalent 20.4 30.6 25 24.1 41.9 
A level or equivalent 10.3 13.8 51.7 24.1 11.2 
Higher education 
 
37.2 20.9 32.6 9.3 16.7 
Geographical location      
Prosperous England 8.8 20.6 44.1 26.5 13.2 
Urban fringe 27.5 33.3 7.3 31.9 26.7 
Rural areas 17.8 17.8 42.2 22.3 17.4 
Outer London & Education 
centres 
35.4 29.4 17.6 17.6 6.6 
Inner London     0 
Coast and Services 10.3 34.5 41.4 13.8 11.2 
Mining, manufacturing & 
industry 
 
28.1 28.1 23.4 20.3 24.8 
Job characteristics      
Occupation      
Clerical and admin 25.2 12.6 50 12.6 3.1 
Craft and related  17.8 23.3 38.4 20.5 28.3 
Personal and protective 
services 
28.6 28.6 20.6 22.2 24.4 
Sales 0 66.7 33.3 0 1.2 
Operative and Assembly 28.8 23.7 18.6 28.8 22.9 
Other unskilled 
 
10.8 36.5 23.1 26.9 20.2 
Job tenure      
< 1 year 20 30 23 27 38.8 
1 – 2 years 24.1 17.3 34.5 24.1 11.2 
2 – 5 years 22 43.9 29.3 4.9 15.9 
5 – 10 years 25.6 25.6 25.6 22.8 16.7 
10+ years 
 
22.2 15.5 28.9 33.3 17.4 
Part-time 20 38.8 23.7 17.5 31 
Fulltime 
 
32 39.9 28.1 26.4 69 
Workplace characteristics      
Industry      
Production sector 27.1 22.9 27.1 22.7 27.3 
Public services 23.9 23.9 28.5 23.9 8.2 
Private services 
 
21 29.3 25.8 24 65.2 
Non union representative at 
workplace 
9.5 33.3 28.6 28.6 8.4 
Workplace size      
1 – 9 employees 10.5 29.8 33.3 24.7 22.4 
10 – 24 employees 19.3 19.3 35.1 26.3 22.4 
25 – 99 employees 28.8 31.2 17.5 22.5 31.4 
100 – 499 employees 20.5 30.8 25.6 23.1 15.3 
500 + employees 36 18.2 27.3 18.2 8.5 
 
Weighted base:  205 individual employees in non-manual jobs 
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Table 3:  Estimated marginal effects on individual willingness to join a union among non-manual 
employees 
 
 Change in % 
probability of 
being very 
likely to join 
Change in % 
probability of 
being fairly 
likely to join 
Change in % 
probability of 
being unlikely 
to join 
Change in % 
probability of 
being not at all 
likely to join 
Sample mean 
 
10.1 23.6 32.1 34.2 
Job satisfaction (ref:  fairly 
satisfied) 
    
Very satisfied -10.3*** -10.8*** -0.1*** 21.2*** 
Not very satisfied 3 3.2 0 -6.2 
Not at all satisfied 
 
10.6 * 11* 0 -21.6* 
Pay (ref:  pay is reasonable)     
Pay is ‘on the high side’ -3 -3 - 6 
Pay is ‘a bit low’ -1 -1 0 2 
Pay is ‘very low’ 
 
6* 7* 0 -13* 
Individual characteristics     
Current union member 11** 11** 0 -22** 
Former union member 0.7 0.7 0 -1.4 
Intention to quit  1.2 1.2 0 -2.4 
Political attitudes -4.2*** -4.5*** 0 8.7*** 
Social attitudes 1 0 -1 0 
Age (ref:  age 18 – 24)     
25 – 34 -10.3 0 5.3 5 
35 – 44 -3.2 -3.3 0 6.6 
45 – 59 -4.3 -4.5 0 8.8 
60+ 
 
-18.8*** -19.8*** -0.01*** 38.7*** 
Gender (ref:  men)     
Women 
 
3.5 3.7 0 -7.2 
Marital status (ref:  married)     
Single 
 
2.7 2.6 0 5.3 
Ethnicity (ref:  white)     
Non-white 
 
-2.3 -2.4 0 4.7 
Highest educational 
qualification (ref:  GCSE or 
equivalent) 
    
None -1.5 -1.6 0 3.1 
A level or equivalent 1.6 1.6 0 3.2 
Higher education 
 
-4.6* -4.9* 0 9.5* 
Geographical location (ref:  
prosperous England) 
    
Urban fringe 2.1 2.2 0 -4.3 
Rural areas 6.1* 6.4* 0.1* -12.6* 
Outer London & Education 
centres 
7* 7.4* 0.1* -12.6* 
Inner London 2.1 2.2 0 -4.3 
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 Change in % 
probability of 
being very 
likely to join 
Change in % 
probability of 
being fairly 
likely to join 
Change in % 
probability of 
being unlikely 
to join 
Change in % 
probability of 
being not at all 
likely to join 
Coast and Services 4.9 5.1 0 -10 
Mining, manufacturing & 
industry 
 
7.5** 7.8** 0.1 -15.4** 
Job characteristics     
Occupation (ref:  Manager and 
senior administrative) 
    
Professional -2.8 -3 0 5.8 
Associate professional and 
technical 
5.1 5.3 0 -10.4 
Clerical 1.9 2 0 -3.9 
Craft and related      
Personal and protective services -10.9 -11.5 -0.1 22.5 
Sales 0.7 0.8 0 -1.5 
Operative and Assembly     
Other unskilled 
 
11.4 11.9 0.1 -23.4 
Job tenure (ref:  <1 year)     
1 – 2 years 2.2 2.3 0 4.5 
2 – 5 years 5.1** 5.4** 0 -10.5** 
5 – 10 years 5 5.3 0 -10.3 
10+ years 
 
-0.4 -0.3 0 0.7 
Part-time (<30 hours per week) 0.1 0.2 0 -0.3 
Workplace characteristics     
Industry sector (ref:  private 
services) 
    
Production sector 0 0 0 0 
Public services -1.6 -1.7 0 3.3 
Non union representative at 
workplace 
-0.6 -0.6 0 1.2 
Workplace size (ref:  1-9 
employees) 
    
10 – 24 employees -0.7 -0.7 0 1.4 
25 – 99 employees -1.2 -1.2 0 2.4 
100 – 499 employees -0.4 -0.5 - -0.9 
500 + employees 0.6 0.6 0 -1.2 
 
Notes: 
1. n= 285 
2. The marginal effects reported in this table were calculated from the coefficients reported in Table A1. 
3. Marginal effects can be interpreted as the estimated change in the predicted probability of an individual 
being in each category compared to the sample mean if the dummy variable changes from zero to one, 
other things being equal.  In the case of the two scale variables (political and social attitudes) the 
marginal effect can be interpreted as the change in predicted probability of being in each category if 
there is a one standard deviation change in the individual’s position on the scale. 
4.  * indicates the statistical significance of the underlying coefficient.  *= significant at  the 10% level or 
higher, **= significant at the 5% level or higher and ***= significant at the 1% level or higher. 
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Table 4:  Estimated marginal effects on individual willingness to join a union among manual employees 
 
 Change in % 
probability of 
being very 
likely to join 
Change in % 
probability of 
being fairly 
likely to join 
Change in % 
probability of 
being unlikely 
to join 
Change in % 
probability of 
being not at all 
likely to join 
Sample mean 
 
21.7 27.8 25.7 24.8 
Job satisfaction (ref:  fairly 
satisfied) 
    
Very satisfied -11.5** -4.1** 3.4** 12.3** 
Not very satisfied 8.2 3 -2.4 -8.8 
Not at all satisfied 
 
-9 -3.2 2.6 9.9 
Pay (ref:  pay is reasonable)     
Pay is ‘on the high side’ -4.7 -1.7 1.4 5 
Pay is ‘a bit low’ 6.5 2.4 -1.9 -7 
Pay is ‘very low’ 
 
5.8 2.1 -1.7 -6.2 
Individual characteristics     
Current union member 14.9 5.4 -4.4 -15.9 
Former union member 10.1* 3.7* -3* -10.8* 
Intention to quit  -1.1 -0.4 0.3 1.2 
Political attitudes -6* -2* 2* 6* 
Social attitudes -4.3 -1.5 1.3 4.6 
Age (ref:  age 18 – 24)     
25 – 34 5.9 2.1 -1.7 -6.3 
35 – 44 -3.3 -1.2 1 3.5 
45 – 59 -4.8 -1.8 1.4 5.2 
60+ 
 
-33.4** -12** 9.8** 35.6** 
Gender (ref:  men)     
Women 
 
8.5 3 -2.5 -9 
Marital status (ref:  married)     
Single 
 
1 0.4 -0.3 -1.1 
Ethnicity (ref:  white)     
Non-white 
 
-5.6 -2 1.6 6 
Highest educational 
qualification (ref:  GCSE or 
equivalent) 
    
None 9.1 3.3 -2.7 -9.7 
A level or equivalent -6.8 -2.5 2 7.3 
Higher education 
 
23.6*** 8.5*** -6.9*** -25.2*** 
Geographical location (ref:  
prosperous England) 
    
Urban fringe 6.8 2.5 -2 -7.3 
Rural areas 5.4 1.9 -1.6 -5.8 
Outer London & Education 
centres 
33.3*** 
 
 
12*** -9.8*** -35.6*** 
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 Change in % 
probability of 
being very 
likely to join 
Change in % 
probability of 
being fairly 
likely to join 
Change in % 
probability of 
being unlikely 
to join 
Change in % 
probability of 
being not at all 
likely to join 
Inner London     
Coast and Services 14.8* 5.3* -4.3* -15.8* 
Mining, manufacturing & 
industry 
 
17.1** 6.1** -5** -18.2** 
Job characteristics     
Occupation (ref:  Operative and 
assembly) 
    
Clerical 10.1 3.6 -3 -10.8 
Craft and related  3.4 1.2 1 3.6 
Personal and protective services -12.1 -4.4 3.6 12.9 
Other unskilled 
 
-13* -4.7* 3.8* 13.9* 
Job tenure (ref:  <1 year)     
1 – 2 years 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
2 – 5 years 10.5** 3.8** -3.1** -11.2** 
5 – 10 years -1.8 -0.6 -0.5 1.9 
10+ years 
 
-3.4 -1.2 1 3.6 
Part-time (<30 hours per week) 19.2** 6.9** 5.6** -20.5** 
Workplace characteristics     
Industry sector (ref:  private 
services) 
    
Production sector -1.2 -0.4 0.4 1.2 
Public services -10.3 -3.7 3 11 
Non union representative at 
workplace 
-0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 
Workplace size (ref:  1-9 
employees) 
    
10 – 24 employees 3.8 1.4 -1.2 -4 
25 – 99 employees 5.9 2.1 -1.7 -6.3 
100 – 499 employees -0.8 -0.2 0.2 0.8 
500 + employees 18.7* 6.7* -.5* -19.9* 
 
Notes: 
1. n= 197 
2. The marginal effects reported in this table were calculated from the coefficients reported in Table A1. 
3. Marginal effects can be interpreted as the estimated change in the predicted probability of an individual 
being in each category compared to the sample mean if the dummy variable changes from zero to one.  
In the case of the two scale variables (political and social attitudes) the marginal effect can be 
interpreted as the change in predicted probability of being in each category if there is a one standard 
deviation change in the individual’s position on the scale. 
4.  * indicates the statistical significance of the underlying coefficient.  *= significant at  the 10% level or 
higher, **= significant at the 5% level or higher and ***= significant at the 1% level or higher. 
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Table 5 - Estimated probability of willingness to join a union for composite workers 
 
Characteristics of composite workers Probability of being 
willing to join 
1. High probability manual worker 
Individual characteristics:  Female, aged 25-34, married, white, no formal qualifications, former 
union member, lives in a mining, manufacturing and industry area, does not intend to quit work in 
next 12 months.  Social and political views are set to the sample mean. 
Job characteristics:  Full-time, operative and assembly occupation, job tenure 2 – 5 years, 
dissatisfied with the job, and believes own pay is low. 
Workplace characteristics:  Production sector, 25-100 employees, no non-union representation 
system. 
 
0.97 
2. Average probability manual worker 
Individual characteristics:  Male, aged 35-44, married, white, GCSE’s or equivalent, never been 
a union member, lives in an urban fringe area, does not intend to quit work in next 12 months.  
Social and political views are set to the sample mean. 
Job characteristics:  Full-time, operative and assembly occupation, job tenure 5-10 years, 
satisfied with the job, and believes own pay is reasonable. 
Workplace characteristics:  Production sector, 25-100 employees, no non-union representation 
system. 
 
0.52 
3. Low probability manual worker 
Individual characteristics:  Male, aged 35-44, white, married,  A levels or equivalent, never been 
a union member, lives in a prosperous England area, does not intend to quit work in next 12 
months.  Social and political views are set to the sample mean. 
Job characteristics:  Full-time, craft occupation, job tenure 5-10 years, very satisfied with the 
job, and believes own pay is on the high side. 
Workplace characteristics:  Production sector, 25-99 employees, no non-union representation 
system. 
 
0.007 
4. High probability non-manual worker 
Individual characteristics:  Male, aged 25 – 34, single A level or equivalent, never been a union 
member, lives in a mining, manufacturing and industry area, does not intend to quit in next 12 
months.  Social and political views set to the sample mean. 
Job characteristics:  Full-time, technical occupation, job tenure 2 – 5 years, very dissatisfied with 
job and believes own pay is low. 
Workplace characteristics:  Private services sector, 25 – 99 employees, no non-union 
representation. 
 
0.961 
5. Average probability non-manual worker 
Individual characteristics:  Female, aged 45 – 59, married, GCSEs or equivalent, never been a 
union member, lives in a urban fringe area, does not intend to quit work in the next 12 months.  
Social and political views are set to the sample mean. 
Job characteristics:  Full-time, sales occupation, job tenure 5 – 10 years, satisfied with job, 
believes own pay is reasonable. 
Workplace characteristics:  Private services, 100 – 499 employees, no non-union representation 
 
0.34 
6. Low probability non-manual worker 
Individual characteristics:  Male, aged 25-34, married, higher education, never been a union 
member, lives in prosperous England, does not intend to quit in next 12 months.  Social and 
political views are set to the sample mean. 
Job characteristics:  Full-time, managerial occupation, job tenure 5 – 10 years, very satisfied 
with job and believes own pay is on the high side. 
Workplace characteristics:  Private services, 25 – 100 employees, no non-union representation. 
0.014 
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Table 6:  Projected change in numbers employed by occupation 1999 – 2010 
 
Occupational group Projected change 1999 - 2010 
Managers and senior officials 5,840 
Professionals 155,140 
Associate professional and technical 53,810 
Administrative and clerical 14,370 
Craft and skilled trades -75,120 
Personal and protective services -4,080 
Sales -2,580 
Operative and assembly occupations -108,600 
Elementary occupation -82,560 
All 72,52 
 
Source:  Institute for Employment Research/ Department for Education and Employment 
(http://www.skillsbase.dfee.gov.uk/Database)
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Table 7:  Population change 1991 – 1998 by socio-economic area 
 
 Population 
1998 
Population change 
1991 - 1998 
% change 1991 – 
1998 
Rural Areas 6,580,000 280,000 +4.4 
Urban Fringe 11,497,000 308,000 +2.7 
Coast and Services 7,289,000 121,000 +1.7 
Prosperous England 8,827,000 371,000 +4.4 
Mining, Manufacturing 
and Industry 
16,311,000 -56,000 -0.4 
Education Centres and 
Outer London 
4,749,000 198,000 +4.4 
Inner London 2,295,000 120,000 +5.5 
 
Source:  Bailey et al. (1999) p. 31.
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Technical Appendix 
 
A.1.  Measures of political and social attitudes 
 
Since 1986, the British Social Attitudes Surveys has contained identical scales for measuring 
Social and Political attitudes.  Political attitudes on a five item left right scale.  On each item 
the respondent is asked to assess the extent he or she disagrees with a statement on a five-
point scale.  The items in the scale are: 
1. Government should redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well 
off. 
2. Big business benefits the owners at the expense of the workers. 
3. Ordinary working people do not get a fair share of the nations wealth. 
4. There is one law for the rich and one for the poor. 
5. Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance. 
If the respondent strongly agrees with an item they score one, if they strongly disagree 
they score five.  The scale is calculated from sum of the scores for all five items.  Social 
attitudes are measured in the same way.  The items on the social attitudes scale are: 
1. Young people today don’t have enough respect for traditional British values. 
2. People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences. 
3. Schools should teach children to obey authority. 
4. The law should always be obeyed even if a particular law is wrong. 
5. Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards. 
Both of these scales were standardised before they were used in the regression analyses. 
 
A.2  The ONS Classification of local authorities 
 
The ONS classification of local authorities in Great Britain groups units of local government 
into clusters, groups and families with similar socio-economic characteristics using data from 
the 1991 census.  The rich census data was reduced to a set of 37 aggregate variables for each 
local authority area.  These variables measured the age and racial profiles of an area, 
household composition, type of housing, population turnover, the proportion of the 
population with a higher education qualification, the proportion in each social class based on 
occupation, the proportions of lone carer and lone parent households, two earner households, 
two car households and no car households and the rate of limiting long-term illness.  Local 
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authority areas were then grouped into clusters, families and groups based on analysis of 
similarity and difference.  Full details of the methodology used can be found in Bailey et al. 
(1999).  Table A2 summarises the families, groups and clusters.   
 
A.3  General modelling approach 
 
Because the dependent variable (individual willingness to join a union) is an ordinal variable 
– individuals are asked to assess the likelihood that they would join a union on a four-point 
scale, the appropriate method of analysis is ordered probit analysis.  Observations with 
missing information are omitted from the analysis.  Both models are run using data weighted 
by the inverse of the individuals sampling probability.  This means that the results can be 
generalized to the population from which the sample is drawn.  It also prevents estimation 
bias caused by differential sample selection probabilities (Skinner, 1997).  The Huber-White 
robust variance estimator was used; this estimation method produces consistent standard 
errors in the presence of heteroscedasticity.  This procedure uses pseudo-likelihood methods, 
so the point estimates are from a weighted ‘likelihood,’ which is not the distribution function 
from the sample.  This means that standard likelihood ratio tests are not valid (STATA 
manual, release 6, Volume 4, 1999).  The full results for both models, including coefficients 
and robust standard errors are set out in Table A2.   
Some Police Officers (identified by 3 digit SOC code) identified themselves as 
working in non-union workplaces.  Police Officers are represented by the Police Federation, 
so are not eligible for union membership even if they desired it.  Consequently any members 
of the Police were dropped from the analysis. 
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Table A1:  Mean values of political and social attitudes scale 
 
 Manual  Non-manual  
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard deviation 
Political attitudes 
scale 
2.38 0.55 2.7 0.76 
Social attitudes scale 3.86 0.59 3.75 0.62 
 
Weighted base:  300 employees (non-manual) and 205 employees (manual)
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Table A2:  Full results of ordered probit analyses on individual willingness to join a union and belief in 
union instrumentality 
 
 Model 1 
Non-manual employees 
Model 2 
Manual employees 
 Coefficient  
(robust standard errors 
in parentheses) 
Coefficient  
(robust standard errors 
in parentheses) 
Job satisfaction (ref:  fairly satisfied)   
Very satisfied -0.7916 
(0.162)*** 
-0.4807 
(0.214)** 
Not very satisfied 0.2344 
(0.249) 
0.3443 
(0.306) 
Not at all satisfied 
 
0.8083* 
(0.426) 
-0.3744 
(0.456) 
Pay (ref:  Pay is reasonable)   
Pay is ‘on the high side’ -0.2244 
(0.294) 
-0.1962 
(0.508) 
Pay is ‘a bit low’ -0.0938 
(0.183) 
0.2726 
(0.23) 
Pay is ‘very low’ 
 
0.4844 
(0.261)* 
0.243 
(0.263) 
Individual characteristics   
Current union member 0.8727 
(0.405)** 
0.6216 
(0.481) 
Former union member 0.0513 
(0.27) 
0.424 
(0.237)* 
Intention to quit  0.091 
(0.187) 
-0.47 
(0.244) 
Political attitudes  -0.3244 
(0.079)*** 
-0.2488 
(0.129)* 
Social attitudes -0.0372 
(0.08) 
-0.1795 
(0.111) 
Age  (ref:  18-24)   
25 – 34 -0.3849 
(0.275) 
0.2481 
(0.3) 
35 – 44 -0.245 
(0.31) 
-0.1391 
(0.334) 
45 – 59 -0.3273 
(0.334) 
-0.2048 
(0.391) 
60+ 
 
-1.4504 
(0.422)*** 
-1.393 
(0.637)** 
Gender (ref:  men)   
Women 
 
0.2706 
(0.174 
0.3526 
(0.291) 
Marital status (ref:  married)   
Single 0.1963 
(0.189) 
0.0427 
(0.212) 
Ethnicity (ref:  white)   
Non-white 
 
-0.1751 
(0.453) 
-0.2356 
(0.436) 
Highest educational qualification (ref:  GCSE or 
equivalent) 
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 Model 1 
Non-manual employees 
Model 2 
Manual employees 
 Coefficient  
(robust standard errors 
in parentheses) 
Coefficient  
(robust standard errors 
in parentheses) 
None -0.1139 
(0.236) 
0.3798 
(0.245) 
A level 0.1193 
(0.21) 
-0.285 
(0.22) 
Higher education 
 
-0.3572 
(0.206)* 
0.9863 
(0.3)*** 
Geographical location (ref:  Prosperous England)   
Urban fringe 0.1624 
(0.223) 
0.2846 
(0.322) 
Rural areas 0.4713 
(0.261)* 
0.2259 
(0.307) 
Outer London & Education centres 0.5409 
(0.324)* 
1.3897 
(0.493)*** 
Inner London 0.159 
(0.563) 
- 
Coast and Services 0.3751 
(0.311) 
0.6178 
(0.329)* 
Mining, manufacturing & industry 
 
0.5751 
(0.234)** 
0.7134 
(0.321)** 
Job characteristics   
Occupation  (ref:  managers and senior 
administrators) 
(ref:  operative and 
assembly) 
Professional -0.2161 
(0.299) 
 
Associate professional and technical 0.3899 
(0.312) 
 
Clerical 0.1485 
(0.227) 
0.422 
(0.537) 
Craft and related   0.1437 
(0.304) 
Personal and protective services -0.8417 
(0.585) 
-0.5063 
(0.371) 
Sales 0.056 
(0.275) 
-0.4808 
(0.496) 
Other unskilled 
 
0.8736 
(0.802) 
-0.5436 
(0.326)* 
Job tenure (ref:  <1 year)   
1 – 2 years 0.1706 
(0.23) 
0.0064 
(0.3) 
2 – 5 years 0.3928 
(0.197)** 
0.442 
(0.221)** 
5 – 10 years 0.3858 
(0.244) 
-0.0736 
(0.294) 
10+ years 
 
-0.0262 
(0.272) 
-0.1422 
(0.294) 
Part-time (<30 hours per week, ref:  full-time) 0.0109 
(0.21) 
0.802 
(0.267)*** 
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 Model 1 
Non-manual employees 
Model 2 
Manual employees 
 Coefficient  
(robust standard errors 
in parentheses) 
 
Coefficient  
(robust standard errors 
in parentheses) 
Workplace characteristics   
Industry sector (ref:  private services)   
Production sector -0.0043 
(0.196) 
-0.0493 
(0.26) 
Public services -0.1231 
(0.354) 
-0.431 
(0.448) 
Non union rep present -0.0454 
(0.2) 
-0.0055 
(0.29) 
Workplace size (ref:  1-9 employees)   
10 – 24 employees -0.0528 
(0.241) 
0.1575 
(0.264) 
25 – 99 employees -0.0341 
(0.204) 
0.2486 
(0.25) 
100 – 499 employees -0.0341 
(0.231) 
-0.0314 
(0.341) 
500 + employees 0.0455 
(0.329) 
0.7814 
(0.419)* 
Cut 1 -0.4658 
(0.407) 
0.3226 
(0.537) 
Cut 2 0.6698 
(0.412) 
1.177 
(0.536) 
Cut 3 1.8372 
(0.419) 
2.12 
(0.538) 
Cut 4   
Wald Chi2 test 179.3 77.1 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.001 
n 285 197 
 
Notes: 
1. * = statistically significant at the 10% level or higher.  ** = statistically significant at the 5% level or 
higher.  *** = statistically significant at the 1% level or higher. 
2. The measures of social and political attitudes are the standardised scores of the British Social Attitudes 
libertarian-authoritarian scale ‘left-right’ scale respectively. 
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Table A3:  ONS classification of local authorities using socio-economic data from the 1991 census 
Family Groups within family Clusters within family Typical local authority 
Rural Areas 
 
 
 
 
1.  Remoter Rural 
2.  Rural Amenity 
 
i.  Rural Scotland 
ii.  Rural England & 
Wales 
 
Highland 
Herefordshire 
Urban Fringe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.Established 
manufacturing fringe 
2.New & Developing 
areas 
3.  Mixed Urban 
 
 
 
i.  New Towns 
ii.  Developing Towns 
i.  Most Typical Towns 
& Cities 
ii.  London & Glasgow 
periphery 
Flintshire 
 
Northampton 
 
Stockport 
 
Hertsmere 
Coast & Services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.Coast & Country 
resorts 
 
 
2.  Established Service 
Centres 
i.  Seaside Towns 
ii.  Traditional Rural 
Coast 
 
Shepway 
Arun 
 
 
City of Bristol 
Prosperous England 
 
 
 
 
 
1.Growth Areas 
 
 
 
2.  Most prosperous 
i.  Town & Country  
Growth 
ii.  Prosperous Growth 
Areas 
Tewkesbury 
 
East Hants 
 
Tandridge 
Mining, Manufacturing 
 & Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.Coalfields 
 
 
 
2.Manufacturing Centres 
3.Ports & Industry 
 
i.  Mining & Inner City 
ii.  Mining & Industry 
iii.  Former Mining 
Areas 
 
 
i.  Urban Industry 
ii.Liverpool & 
Manchester 
iii.  Clydeside & Dundee 
Halton 
Wakefield 
Wear Valley 
 
Coventry 
 
North Ayshire 
Liverpool 
 
Dundee City 
Education Centres & 
Outer London 
 
 
 
 i.  Suburbs 
ii.  Cosmopolitan Outer 
London 
iii.  Education Centres 
Croydon 
Waltham Forest 
 
Brighton & Hove 
Inner London 1.  West Inner London 
2.  East Inner London 
 
i.  Inner City Boroughs 
ii.  Newham & Tower 
Hamlets 
Camden 
Southwark 
 
Source:  Bailey et al. (1999), pp. 120 & 58-99. 
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